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GROUP AGENCY AND
GROUP RIGHTS
JAMES W. NICKEL

One source of discomfort with group or collective rights is the
belief that many groups, and particularly ethnic groups, are deficient as rightholders. (I'll call this the "Deficiency Thesis" and
abbreviate it as "DT"). An extreme version of DT concludes that
groups are so lacking in the characteristics required of competent
rightholders that it never makes sense to attribute rights to
groups.' In this chapter, I explore and evaluate a more modest
version of DT. It doesn't deny that groups can have agency and
rights, but suggests that assigning rights to groups is generally a
bad idea because groups are often unable to play an active role in
exercising, interpreting, and defending their rights. The source
of this inability is that groups often lack effective agency and clear
identity. Effective agency is a matter of being able to form goals,
deliberate, choose, intend, act, and carry out evaluations of actions taken. Agency requires specific capacities such as finding
information, monitoring conditions, setting and formulating
goals, evaluating options, recognizing and following norms, planning, acting, and evaluating outcomes. Clear identity is a matter
of having reasonably clear boundaries so that it is possible to say
which persons belong to the group, share in its responsibilities,
should have a say in the group's affairs, and are entitled to some
share of benefits the group receives. We will see that agency and
identity are closely related.
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Ultimately I deny that DT is true of all or even most groups,
but I suggest that it may be true of some ethnic minoritiesparticularly those without territories. Further, I defend the view
that clear identity and effective agency are needed for groups to
benefit from most of the rights that are currently put forward as
group rights. Together, these two propositions suggest that it will
often be unwise to give group rights to nonterritorial minorities.
But there are practical measures available to construct the clear
identity and effective agency that will enable nonterritorial minorities to be capable rightholders. The costs of constructing these
characteristics may be high and in addition will turn the group
into an entity that is less fuzzy, more durable, and more active.
The social and political consequences of giving a minority ethnic
group these characteristics may be profound.
My concern is with group rights that have or are intended for
political and legal implementation. The sorts of rights that groups
claim are extremely varied. They include rights against genocide, 2
forced assimilation, 3 and ethnic cleansing, 4 to secession, 5 selfdetermination,6 semi-autonomous status, territory, control over
resources,7 recognition as distinctive and/or oppressed, 8 recognition of a group's language as one of the official languages of the
country,9 subsidies to help keep a culture alive,' 0 a fair share of
public funding,'" expanded educational and economic opportunities, political participation as groups,' 2 and full citizenship and
nondiscrimination for their members. This list suggests that group
rights are so varied that it is hard to have a single attitude towards
them.
My arguments do not rely on any particular conception of what
a group right is. I emphasize that many group rights require
exercise, administration, and defense but view this fact as contingent rather than necessary. There are at least three reasons why a
right might be considered a group right. First, a right might be
considered a group right because it is a right that only some
ethnic, national, or minority groups and not all citizens have.
Kymlicka calls these "group-differentiated rights," and notes that
some of these rights can be held and exercised by individuals.' 3
Second, a right might be considered a group right because it is
the group, acting through its leadership, that has the legal power
to invoke or waive the right. For example, a group's right to its
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land may be considered a group right because only the group
acting through its leadership has the power to make decisions
about the disposition of that land. Third, a right may be considered a group right because the interests it protects are collective
or shared rather than individual.' 4 None of these conceptions of
the nature of a group right enjoys universal or near-universal
acceptance, so instead of relying on one of these conceptions I
will work with a list of rights that almost everyone takes to be
examples of group rights.

I. ARE

GROUPS DEFICIENT AS RIGHTHOLDERS?

A. The Unrestricted Deficiency Thesis (UDT)
UDT asserts that groups almost never have clear identity and
effective agency. In this section, I elaborate and evaluate this
thesis, ultimately concluding that UDT is not generally true. In
the next section, I suggest that a more restricted version of DT
probably is true.
Groups, unlike normal individuals, are often internally divided,
unorganized, unclear in their boundaries, and are therefore unable to engage in actions as groups. For example, families are
routinely given rights to decide on the medical care of one of
their members who is temporarily or permanently unable to make
decisions, but they often have difficulties in knowing which members should be allowed to participate in the decision (Is it only
the spouse-if any-and children? Does it include the spouses of
the children? Does it include siblings or cousins of the patient?
Does it include grandchildren?). Further, their discussions and
attempts to organize themselves often fail to produce a member
who can legitimately speak for the family as a whole. As a result,
"the family" often speaks with several inconsistent voices.
As this example suggests, identity and agency are closely related. Fractiousness and lack of clear identity often make it hard
for groups to have authorized leadership that can genuinely speak
and decide on behalf of the group. The most assertive or politically engaged members may attempt to speak and decide on
behalf of the group, but this assumption of leadership is unauthorized and may lead to protests and schisms. In order to authorize
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leaders through an election, or even through acquiescence in
their leadership role, it is necessary to know who the members
are. Otherwise one does not know who is qualified to vote or
acquiesce. Yet it is often difficult to know exactly who the members
are. For example, does the group of Hispanics or Latinos in the
United States include Haitian Americans, Brazilian Americans,
or Italian Americans? These people come from countries with
languages derived from Latin that are nevertheless not "Hispanic."
UDT can be used as part of an argument against group rights:
Premise 1: Good rightholders must have reasonably clear
identity and effective agency.
Premise 2 (UDT): Groups almost never have clear identity
and effective agency.
Subconclusion: Groups are almost never good rightholders.
Premise 3: If groups are almost never good rightholders,
then rights should almost never be assigned to groups or
recognized as belonging to groups.
Conclusion: Rights should almost never be assigned to or
recognized as belonging to groups.

B. The Implausibility of the Unrestricted Deficiency Thesis
UDT is not plausible. There are numerous examples of groups
that have clear identity and effective agency. Examples of such
groups include Boulder County Government, Amnesty International USA, the Mennonite Central Committee, the University of
Colorado at Boulder Philosophy Department, the Boulder Medical Center, Storage Technology Corporation, and Ideal Market.
These are groups with reasonably clear membership requirements
and well-developed procedures for creating and maintaining leadership bodies with effective capacities to act. These groups are
typical of millions of other groups. It just isn't true that groups
almost never have clear identity and effective agency.
Indeed, the agency of groups is often more effective than that
of individuals. This is true notjust in the sense that large organizations can do more things and bigger things, but also in the sense
that organizations sometimes have better resources for decision
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making and action than individuals do. Their capacities for gathering information, developing alternative options for choice, deliberating, planning, deciding, and executing are often superior
to those of individuals. One reason for this is that they can select
talented persons or teams and assign decision-related tasks and
specific actions to them.15
Another way of understanding why groups sometimes have
clear identity and effective agency turns on the fact that there are
available effective procedures and institutions for defining the
membership of a group and for creating and maintaining an
authorized leadership that is able to act. If an informal group
needs clear identity, it can create a constitution and bylaws that
define who the members are, or what a person must do to become
and remain a member. If such a group needs effective agency,
it can identify some leadership roles, with definite powers and
responsibilities, elect members to those roles, and hold them
accountable for effective action through regular evaluations and
elections. Consider the following steps that a group might take to
gain a clearer identity and more effective and democratically
accountable agency:
1. Create or clarify identity. This requires deciding who are the
members of the group. There may seem to be a chicken-and-egg
problem here: which comes first, identity or agency? If a group
doesn't have clear identity, how can it choose a process for selecting leaders? And if it doesn't have agency, how can it define the
parties eligible to vote? There are probably a number of ways to
get out of this difficulty, but here is one-which I'll call "bootstrapping." It requires that a very large majority of an informal
group be in favor of a constitutional scheme that defines a set of
leadership roles and a procedure for electing people to those
roles. This means that the constitution can be ratified and leaders
chosen in an election using a broad definition of who the members are. Alternatively, it means that under any reasonable definition of the boundaries of the group, a majority will exist. Once
the leaders are elected through this process, they can use their
powers to define the membership, or to create a democratic
process for ratifying a membership scheme.
2. Agree on a constitutionalprocess. This involves having or developing some idea of how a constitution can be created. As Profes-
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sor Reaume emphasizes, a key part of creating a constitution is
the creation of what Hart called a "rule of recognition," a principle that allows one to determine whether a norm or decision is a
valid rule or decision of the group.' 6 The legal system of the
country is likely to provide a legal process of incorporationor, more likely, different sorts of processes for different sorts of
organizations such as business corporations, partnerships, and
nonprofit organizations. More broadly, democratic models of constitution-making are widely available and used in the contemporary world. According to these models, a legitimate constitution
can come into existence if a large majority of those to be governed
by it consent to it, or if a large majority of the elected representatives of those people consent to it.
3. Use this process to create a leadership structure and election procedures. A key part of a constitution for a group is the formulation
of a decision-making structure that defines leadership positions,
assigns powers and responsibilities to them, and specifies how
these positions are to be filled.'7
4. Follow the election procedures to fill the leadership positions. The
next step is to create agency by filling the leadership positions
and implementing the decision-making structure.
5. Revisit the identity problem if necessary. If the identity of the
group remains a problem, it can be addressed formally at this
point. The leaders can establish or propose for democratic approval membership criteria. These criteria may specify procedures
that one must have gone through to apply for and receive membership, substantive characteristics such as ancestry, residence,
culture, beliefs, loyalties, or self-perception, or some mixture of
these. An appeals process for those excluded by these criteria can
also be created.
6. Set goals for the group. The leaders of the group can now
establish, or propose for approval, collective goals. This may require meetings, debate, and opinion polls of the members. Once
group goals are established, it will be unproblematic to speak of
the group's interests (conditions that promote those goals). It will
also make sense at this point to speak of the group acting for a
certain reason (e.g., to pursue one of its goals).
7. Devise plans and strategiesfor achieving those goals. Once the
group has a leadership and goals, efforts can be made to deter-
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mine what will be required to realize those goals and to plan for
their realization. When a group is able to do these things it
effectively has the capacity for deliberation.
8. Take actions in accordance with these plans and strategies. The
next step is for the group, acting through its leadership, to take
actions that pursue its goals by following its plans. The group now
displays agency in action.
9. Evaluate actions and reformulate plans and strategies. Not all
plans and efforts to realize the group's goals will be successful. To
deal with this, the group's leadership will need to engage in
monitoring, evaluation, and reformulation of goals and plans.
There are dozens of ways in which these steps can fail, but in
fact they often succeed. It may be thought that these mechanisms
work for small organizations but not for large ones. But many
countries and territorial ethnic groups have used exactly these
sorts of mechanisms for defining their members (citizens) and
selecting their leaders.
C. The Restricted Deficiency Thesis (RDT)
Although it is untrue that all-or even most-groups are deficient as rightholders, an advocate of DT might wish to restrict the
thesis so that it only applies to ethnic minorities, or some subset
of ethnic minorities.
Nonterritorial ethnic minorities' 8 often lack clear identity and
effective agency. Ethnic minorities in the United States such as
African Americans, Hispanics, and Jewish Americans typically
have no formal criteria for who their members are and rely on
self-definition or broad, vague social understandings of what
makes one a member. Further, such groups are not tightly organized under a single leadership that can unproblematically speak
for all of the members of the group. They are nonterritorial in
the sense that they do not have established territories within the
country. Thus the country in which the group lives is either not
territorially and governmentally differentiated along group lines,
or the territorial and governmental differentiations that do exist
refer only to other groups (e.g., to the Navaho, but not to African
Americans).
This qualification results in a new version of DT: Restricted
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Deficiency Thesis (RDT): Nonterritorial ethnic minorities almost
never have clear identity and effective agency. When the argument against group rights given in section I is adapted to fit RDT,
its conclusion is: Rights should almost never be assigned to or
recognized as belonging to nonterritorial ethnic minorities.
But is RDT true? This is an empirical question, but the plausibility of RDT can be supported by listing some of the factors that
make it difficult for nonterritorial ethnic minorities to have clear
identity and effective agency. Clear identity is hard to create
because many members will have mixed localities (and some will
have mixed ancestry). Some will resent having to choose formally
to be in or out, and they lose little if they refuse to choose. A
formal and comprehensive system of membership is costly to
maintain, and may have little pay-off as long as the group lives
within a larger society of which its members are full-fledged citizens. The fact that the group is nonterritorial means that the
easiest kind of membership system, one which equates membership with permanent residence in a territory, is unavailable. Effective agency is also hard to create because the group is likely to be
large, politically and economically diverse, geographically dispersed, partially mixed with other groups, divided by factions,
schisms, and competing political visions, and lacking in a comprehensive system of formal membership.
These factors make it difficult for legitimate leaders to be
chosen and authorized by the group. To be authorized to speak
and choose for the group, leaders must have been elected by a
majority, or selected in something closely analogous to an election. But conducting an election or poll is difficult when the
group has fuzzy membership criteria. If self-selection is the basis
for participation in polling, outsiders may seek to influence the
outcome. And if one only polls people who are clear-cut members,
one may disenfranchise the dissenting views of marginal members. Notice that this argument goes from lack of clear identity
to lack of effective and authorized agency. Notice also that the
"bootstrapping" process described earlier may make it possible to
get around this problem.
I find RDT plausible, but the percentage of cases (of nonterritorial ethnic minorities) in which it is true is far from clear.
Nevertheless, no general proposition such as RDT about the
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agency of nonterritorial ethnic minorities needs to be true for the
argument to work when its conclusion is restricted to a particular
group. If the Deficiency Thesis is true of a particular group, then
the argument against group rights given above can be used against
group rights for that group.

II.

GROUP RIGHTS REQUIRE EXERCISE AND TENDING

The fact that a group lacks agency would not make it deficient as
a rightholder unless agency is necessary to having and benefiting
from rights. In this section, I defend the claim that in order for a
group to benefit from politically implemented rights it generally
needs to have effective agency. I do this by identifying six kinds of
activities that rightholders often need to perform in order to
benefit from their rights and showing that these activities are
required as well for the enjoyment of most group rights. Second,
I show that the circumstances that sometimes make possible the
passive enjoyment of legal rights by many rightholders are not
present, or are present to a lesser degree, in the case of legally
implemented group rights. Finally, I show the limited usefulness
in the area of group rights of schemes that empower parties other
than the rightholder to exercise the rights of a group.
In mounting this argument, I will not rely on the general thesis,
asserted by advocates of the "will" or "agency" theory of rights
such as H. L. A. Hart, Wayne Sumner, and Carl Wellman,1 9 that
because genuine rights always confer powers and liberties on their
holders one cannot be a rightholder unless one possesses the
ability to exercise such powers and liberties. I reject this general
thesis but believe that in the area of legally implemented group
rights it is generally true that for rightholders to fully enjoy these
rights they must have effective agency. I will try to show that this
claim is contingently true of legally implemented group rights by
looking at some representative examples of such rights.
A. Group Rights Generally Require Rightholder Agency
It will be helpful in thinking about agency and group rights to
have a general list of activities that rightholders often perform in
relation to their legal rights. In illustrating these six kinds of
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activities, I will use examples of legislative and constitutional
rights because these are the kinds of rights that group rights are
likely to be. These activities pertain to:
Waiver, invocation, and use. To waive one's right (R) to A in a
weak sense one can simply decline to do or receive A in a particular situation in which R applies. For example, one (weakly) waives
one's right to emigrate if one never even considers emigrating.
Waiving a right in a stronger sense involves referring to the right
and rendering it inoperable in the particular situation. For example, a person charged with a crime may formally waive the right to
a trial as part of a plea bargain.
We can make a similar distinction between strong and weak
senses of exercising (or using) a right. To exercise one's right (R)
to A in a weak sense is simply to do or receive A in an environment
in which R helps to increase the availability of A. Using R in this
sense doesn't require thinking about R, or even knowing of its
existence. For example, a person may (weakly) exercise his right
to freedom of speech by making a political speech in an environment in which the right to free speech helps make it safe to make
political speeches. To use R in a stronger sense is to try to do or
receive A while invoking R. To strongly invoke a right R to A is
not merely to do or receive A, but to do or receive A in a particular
situation while claiming R or reminding others of R For example,
a person stopped by police may decline to permit them to search
her car by reminding them of her right against warrantless
searches.

Responsibilities. Responsibilities often accompany the possession
of legal rights. For example, if parents have and exercise the
right to home-school their children, they incur accompanying
responsibilities to actually provide their children with instruction,
reading materials, and other educational opportunities. I use the
word "responsibilities" here to suggest something vaguer and less
formal than duties. For example, even if one doesn't have a legal
duty to vote, one may have moral and civic responsibilities to
exercise one's right to vote in a conscientious and informed way.
Alienation. To alienate a right is to get rid of it permanently.
Forms of alienation include giving, selling, trading, forfeiting, and
repudiating. For example, one can alienate one's citizenship by
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becoming a citizen of another country and repudiating one's
original citizenship.
Interpretation. Rightholders are often required to decide
whether a right applies to the circumstances they are in. Sometimes it will be obvious that a right applies, but in other cases this
will be far from clear. For instance, one may be unsure whether
the right to freedom of expression covers exotic haircuts for
persons in prison. Since people's interpretations of constitutional
and legislative rights are often rejected by officials and judges,
litigation may be necessary to attempt to establish an interpretation of a right.
Monitoring compliance and preventing violations. The activities in
this category can be done by persons other than the rightholder,
but in many circumstances they cannot be done effectively without rightholder participation. To monitor compliance with a right to
do or receive A is to regularly observe whether the addressees
of that right are providing the rightholders with the liberties,
protections, or benefits that the right prescribes. For example, a
likely victim of employment discrimination may watch carefully
for signs that discrimination is occurring. Fending off threatened
violations of one's right, or of someone else's right, involves trying
to prevent those violations before they occur. One may try to do
this by reminding the potential violators of the right, or by taking
steps that make it harder to carry out the violation. For example,
a political dissident who fears being arrested and tortured may
fend off this violation of her rights by making herself hard to find,
or by seeking safety in the embassy of another country. Stopping
violations of a right as they occur is similar, except that a series of
violations has already begun. For example, a woman being subjected to sexual harassment may seek legal assistance in getting
the harasser to stop.
Remedies and compensation. When rights that protect things of
value are violated it is common for people to seek compensation
or remedies for the losses they suffered. For example, a person
who was convicted and imprisoned on the basis of evidence
gained through an illegal search may seek release from prison, or
compensation for the time spent in prison. The rightholder need
not perform these activities alone. They may be done together
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with other people who had the same right violated, with the
assistance of legal counsel, and with the assistance of political and
civil rights organizations.
The sense in which these six kinds of activities are necessary to
the enjoyment of a right needs clarification. 20 I do not deny that
one may gain some benefit from a right even if one is unable to
operate it (see below). The claim is rather that one's capacity to
benefit from a right over time is likely to be greatly reduced if one
is unable to operate it. As an analogy, one might benefit from
having a car even though one was unable to drive (one could
sleep in it, treasure it as a work of art, or get others to drive it),
but to most people the benefits received from having the car
would be greatly reduced.
Let's now apply these six categories to some representative
group rights. The question I want to ask is whether there are
likely circumstances in which a group would be significantly less
able to enjoy the right if it were unable to take one of these six
sorts of actions. For example, consider the group right against
genocide. It is not likely that a group would wish to promote its
interests by waiving or alienating this right. But a group would be
significantly less able to benefit from this right if lacked the
capacity to interpret the right, monitor compliance, fend off potential violations, stop violations that are beginning to occur, and
seek remedies for violations.
For another example, consider a constitutional right that
grants certain groups the right to secede. It is quite possible that
some groups will best promote their goals by waiving or alienating
this right. Further, a group will be significantly less able to enjoy
this right if it lacks the capacity to engage in strong exercise of
the right, fulfill its responsibilities under the process required for
secession, propose interpretations of this right, monitor compliance, fend off potential violations, stop violations that are beginning to occur, and seek remedies for violations.
For a third example, consider a legislatively enacted right held
by specified ethnic and indigenous groups to subsidies to assist
those groups in keeping their distinctive cultures alive. It is quite
possible that some of these groups will seek to promote their goals
by waiving or alienating this right (for example, they may believe
that dependence on the central government creates weakness).
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Further, these groups will be significantly less able to enjoy this
right if they lack the capacity to engage in strong exercise of the
right, fulfill the responsibilities it implies to use these funds for
activities that strengthen their culture, propose interpretations of
this right, monitor compliance, fend off potential violations, stop
violations that are beginning to occur (e.g., when the central
government in a particular year severely cuts these subsidies), and
seek remedies for violations.
I have attempted to show, by reference to a representative set
of legally implemented group rights, that rightholder action to
exercise, administer, and support these rights is likely to be required for their full enjoyment. I now turn to objections that (1)
deny that these activities are always required for enjoyment, and
(2) deny that the rightholder-rather than some other partymust be the one to engage in these activities.
B. Why the Passive Enjoyment of Group Rights Is

Generally Impossible
In response to my claim that rightholders regularly need to perform these six kinds of activities, it might be objected that many
Americans enjoy constitutional rights such as the right to freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures and the right to a trial
by jury yet never engage personally in any of the listed activities
in regard to these rights. With the exception of using and waiving
their rights in the weak senses defined above, many rightholders
don't do anything in relation to their rights. I recognize that this
is true, but will try to show how the factors that make this possible
are unlikely to apply to most group rights. I'll begin by explaining,
with reference to the six activities identified above, how people
can sometimes enjoy rights while doing almost nothing to exercise or manage them.
Waiver, invocation, and use. People can use and waive rights in
the weak senses above without referring to or even knowing about
those rights. In these senses one uses one's right to free speech
when one decides to speak, and one waives it when one decides
not to speak. Second, people can enjoy a right without ever using
it if the situation in which this right applies does not actually arise
in their lives. For example, most people are never charged with a
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crime, and hence never have the opportunity to invoke or waive
their rights of criminal due process. Further, even if a situation
arises that brings the right into play, compliance may be automatic
(e.g., everyone knows and accepts that certain sorts of searches
are impermissible, or that a jury trial is required), so the right
doesn't need to be invoked or claimed.
Responsibilities. Many rights don't impose participatory or administrative responsibilities on their holders. The right to freedom from torture, unlike the right to vote, doesn't have any
associated responsibilities.
Alienation. One can enjoy rights without ever alienating them if
they are not the sorts of rights one can sell or trade and if one
has no desire to repudiate them. Property rights are frequently
alienated, but constitutional and human rights are ones that people seldom alienate-and in some cases are impossible to
alienate.
Interpretation. One can enjoy rights without ever interpreting
them if one enjoys the protections created by a general system of
rights without ever learning what those rights are. Also, one can
let others-particularly those who are actually in the situation in
which the rights come into play-do the work of raising and
litigating issues about their meaning.
Monitoring compliance and preventing violations. One can enjoy
rights without being vigilant against noncompliance if one lives in
a country in which rights are generally respected, and lives in a
way that is unlikely to put one in situations in which one's rights
need to be invoked. Low levels of vigilance may also be reasonable
if one knows that there are many watchdog organizations engaged
in monitoring compliance with people's rights.
Compensation. If most people are never in the situation where
these rights come into play, and if there is a high degree of
compliance with them when they do come into play, then few
people will be in a position to seek compensation for violations.
Although it is possible to have and benefit from rights that one
almost never exercises and tends, the circumstances in which it is
possible are unlikely to apply to group rights. I'll try to show this
by once more enumerating the six kinds of activities.
Group waiver invocation, and use. With the exception of rights
against genocide and ethnocide and the right to secession, group
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rights are likely to be rights that come into play in circumstances
that arise frequently or continuously. For example, if a group
wants a right to political representation as a group, it is because it
believes that it is in a situation in which it is inadequately represented politically and because it expects to be able to use this
right, and the political representation it guarantees, on a regular
basis to ensure the fair treatment and other interests of its members.
Group responsibilities. Group rights often confer duties and responsibilities on their holders. Hence the holders of group rights
should be able to discharge these rights and responsibilities. For
example, if a group acquires a right to educate its own children,
along with the resources to do so, it also acquires thereby the
responsibility to make educational opportunities available to
those children. If a group is granted a right to subsidies for
cultural support, it will have to either accept and arrange to use
this money or waive the right. If a group is granted a right to
semisovereign status within a territory, it will have to arrange to
govern or to waive its right to do so. The responsibilities that go
with many group rights cannot be discharged without active and
effective attention to those rights and the associated interests of
the group.
Groups alienating their rights. Most individual constitutional
rights are not the sorts of rights one can sell or trade, and very
few people wish to repudiate them. But it is easy to imagine
circumstances in which a group might wish to repudiate or trade
one of its rights. If a number of cultural groups including the
Amish were granted subsidies for cultural support, the Amish
would probably refuse to accept such subsidies on the grounds
that they do not wish to be dependent on government (the Amish
do this in other areas such as Social Security benefits).
Groups interpretingtheir rights. Group rights are likely to be more
like contractual rights between a few parties and less like longstanding constitutional rights that apply to all residents of a country. Often, there will be few other groups holding the same rights,
and the ones that do have the same rights may have significantly
different interests and perspectives. Hence a group without much
capacity for agency will be unable to rely on other groups to
defend and litigate advantageous interpretations.
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Groups monitoring compliance and preventing violations. The conditions that make it reasonable for persons to leave to others the
monitoring of compliance with their constitutional rights are unlikely to apply to group rights. First, group rights are likely to be
new rights, and hence habitual compliance with them cannot be
assumed. Second, we saw earlier that most group rights apply to
circumstances in which groups will regularly find themselves. And
third, watchdog organizations that monitor violations of group
rights are far fewer than those that monitor violations of individual rights. Groups such as the ACLU or Amnesty International
are unlikely to monitor compliance with group rights. Further,
minority ethnic groups are unlikely to want their rights to be
mainly monitored by mainstream organizations with which they
have few ties.
Groups seeking remedies and compensation. Since group rights are
likely to be ones that most groups actually exercise and invoke,
and since these rights are also likely to be new rights that the
addressees must learn to accept and comply with, violations are
likely to occur. Thus the desire to seek compensation is likely to
arise.
C. Can Someone Other Than the Rightholder Exercise
Group Rights?
Let's now turn to an objection that says that although group rights
require agents who will use and tend them for the benefit of the
holders, the agents do not have to be the groups themselves. I
accept this possibility since I believe that young children have
both moral and legal rights even though they lack much capacity
for agency. For children, we make enjoyment of rights possible by
assigning other parties the responsibility of deciding issues that
arise about the exercise and tending of a child's rights. The
parties are typically a child's parents or guardians but sometimes
are state agencies. Surely, the objection continues, it is possible to
do something similar for groups so that they do not need to
exercise and tend their own rights.
I have two responses to this objection. One is to continue to
insist that lack of agency is a deficiency in a rightholder, even
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though I allow that it is a deficiency that we can sometimes get
around. The other response is to suggest that for good moral and
political reasons the use of outside agents to exercise and tend
rights has very limited prospects in the area of group rights.
Before elaborating the second response, I want to allow that
exercise of group rights by trustees is an important option, particularly in dealing with indigenous groups that have only recently
come into contact with modern technological civilization and that
have limited ability to understand their legal rights, much less to
exercise and tend them. I have in mind a group such as the
Yanomami of Brazil and Venezuela. The only way in which such a
group can be protected by a scheme of rights that includes rights
against genocide and ethnocide, and to retain and use their
historic territory, is for some outside agency-perhaps a department of indigenous affairs such as FUNAI in Brazil-to exercise
and tend these rights. To make the paternalism and potential for
corruption involved in such a scheme more palatable, we might
advocate the creation of nongovernmental organizations to monitor the decisions made by this agency to make sure that they
promote the interests of the protected group.
Although this option is valuable in some cases, its general
appeal is limited. It works best for rights that serve mainly to
protect the survival and territory of a group (e.g., rights against
genocide, forced assimilation, and to a territory). It works poorly
for rights that mainly serve to promote a protect a group's ability
to decide for itself how it wishes to live and interact with other
groups (e.g., rights to self-determination, control over resources,
political participation as a group, and subsidies for cultural support). It is the latter kind of rights that is most prominent in
contemporary discussions of group rights. There is often hypocrisy
or even contradiction involved when a national government tells
a minority group that it has rights to decide key issues for itself
but then turns around and says that agents of the national government are going to do most of the actual decisionmaking. This
hypocrisy has frequently been seen in the dealings of the U.S.
government with Indian tribes.
A related option is for the national government to rely on
the leaders of a minority group's existing religious, cultural, and
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political organizations to make decisions about the exercise and
maintenance of the group's rights. Instead of trying to create new,
comprehensive institutions that provide leaders authorized to
speak for the entire group it is often easier to rely on the leadership of existing group organizations. If subsidies were given to
groups for cultural support, for example, the responsibilities for
using and administering these funds might be given to existing
group organizations. There are two main problems with this option. One is that the leaders of these organizations are not authorized to represent or make decisions for the entire group, and they
are at best accountable to only part of the group (namely those
that belong to the organization). The other problem is that this
option has limited scope. It is not likely to work for the stronger
forms of group rights. This sort of agency would be inadequate
for the right to control resources, to secede, to limited self-government, and to political participation as a group.

III.

CREATING GROUP AGENCY AND IDENTITY

If an ethnic minority lacks the effective agency needed to exercise
and tend its group rights, and if the options just discussed are not
widely applicable, then there are two main options. One is to
avoid granting or recognizing group rights for groups that lack
effective agency. Sometimes, part of the work that group rights
would have done can be accomplished by giving individual rights
to the members of the group (we might call this the "privatization" of group rights).
The other main option is for nonterritorial ethnic minorities
to try to create the clear identity, effective agency, and legitimated
leaders that are needed for the effective exercise and management of their rights. We saw earlier that there are processes or
steps whereby groups can create clear identities and effective and
legitimate leadership bodies, and it is possible-if not easy-for
nonterritorial ethnic groups to use these procedures. It is easiest
to imagine this happening if the ethnic minority is assisted by the
national government that will be the main addressee of the
group's rights.
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In order to construct clear identity and effective agency, a
group will probably need to have means of encouraging its members to participate and contribute. This is easier if a group's
members mostly live on a territory that it controls. Doing it
through the mail, as it were, is harder. It may be possible to do
this entirely on a voluntary basis, but it seems more likely that
the group will have to become something like a nonterritorial
government. For this to happen, the national government will
have to grant the group access to resources or the coercive power
to tax its members. Further, the group will probably have to
assume responsibility for providing services in areas such as education, law, and health.
The process of creating clear identity and effective agency is
likely to transform a non territorial minority group into something that is less fuzzy, more active, and more durable.21 If a
group acquires a sharper identity this is likely to reinforce its
members' perceptions of their distinctiveness and make them less
willing to accept the gradual merger of their group into a larger
ensemble of minorities or into society at large. If a group acquires
both a clearer identity and more effective ability to act as a
group, this may produce stronger and more politically plausible
demands for recognition, support, fair treatment, or even separation. These changes may be good or bad depending on the circumstances-and I do wish to emphasize that such changes are
sometimes all to the good. But the consequences of these changes
are likely to be sufficiently large and enduring to warrant careful
evaluation of steps intended to create clearer identity and more
effective agency for minority groups. Indeed, the consequences of
making minority groups into capable rightholders may be as large
as the consequences of recognizing, implementing, and respecting their rights.

NOTES
This chapter began as a commentary on Denise Reaume's essay, "Common-Law Constructions of Group Autonomy: A Case Study," but evolved
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indebted to Professor Reaume for stimulating me to take up this topic. I
am also indebted for comments and suggestions to Will Kymlicka, Ian
Shapiro, Peter French, Steve Munzer, Yael Tamir, and Carl Wellman.
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